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Abstract
The impacts of trade liberalisation on technological development are
particularly important because of their dynamic long-term effects on
the economy.
The paper pursues a comprehensive approach to technological
change that relies on drawing a contrast between visible changes in
performance and decision-making processes that stem from a
behavioural dimension. Based on the Argentinean Innovation Survey
(1997) the paper justifies the importance of a joint determination of
these two dimensions for analysing macro-micro links of
technological change as the most adequate way of assessing the
impact of major macro-policy change on technology. It is organised in
three parts.
The first part critically discusses the main theoretical arguments that
relate trade liberalisation to technological accumulation. The second
part claims that the ultimate impact of openness on technological
performance is dependent on its incidence on the elements that
guide firms' technological decisions. Therefore, a model for micro
technological behaviour and trade liberalisation is developed in the
light of the Schumpeterian literature and illustrated using techniques
appropriate for non-parametric data. Part three emphasises the
importance of macro behaviour. Based on empirical information for
the Argentinean case it is claimed that the biological metaphor which
states that an open market is sufficient to select the best performing
firms is often invalid in the context of Argentinean macro behaviour
during the 1990s. On the contrary, firms had higher probabilities of
remaining in the market when they followed a survival attitude
unrelated to productive activities, and this often hampered
technological performance. Thus two distinct patterns emerged, one
corresponding to technological performance and the other to
economic performance.2
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Introduction
In the context of structural adjustment reforms, developing countries have been
challenged to liberalise and simplify their trade policies. The prevailing orthodoxy in
economic theory has justified this switch in policies, claiming that it would foster growth
and efficiency. The impacts of trade liberalisation on technological development are
particularly important because of their dynamic long-term effects on the economy.
The relation between technology and import liberalisation is nevertheless quite
controversial. There is no complete accord, even inside similar schools of thought. Here
the arguments will be classified according to two main hypotheses. The first includes
the new growth theory propositions, based primarily on world allocative efficiency and
the broadening of access to international up-to-date sources of knowledge, which
impact on technological change. The second hypothesis focuses on the need for
developing countries’ firms to achieve indigenous capabilities in order to adopt and
benefit from available technology. According to this view, trade might threaten the
development of those capabilities, because domestic efforts are undercut by foreign
know-how or because the international division of labour imposes on developing
countries the task of specialising in less dynamic technologies.
Therefore, both approaches imply that trade might influence technological change and
would consequently agree that there exists a connection between the micro and the
macro levels, though with opposite consequences.
Although this paper will discuss (and to some extent adopt) both sets of arguments, the
line of reasoning is distinct from both of them. My contention is that, even though trade
does enlarge the external sources of information available for trading countries, it does
not imply that firms within these countries will upgrade their technological skills. Nor will
they necessarily improve their technical or allocative efficiency. However, this does not
use an “infant industry protection” type of explanation. My point is that firm behaviour
needs to be openly considered within each particular macro behaviour in order to
disentangle the extent to which firms benefit from the broader opportunities that
openness creates.
The behavioural link between macro and micro spheres is of paramount importance.
Firms’ decisions are sensitive to a number of determinants (here distinguished as
micro, sectoral and macro determinants), which are path-dependent. Therefore, micro
behaviour is not given in the ways that the conventional approaches in economics have
claimed; instead it changes across countries, sectors, and types of firms.
Two claims guide the discussion of the paper:
  Importance of micro behaviour: The ultimate impact of openness on
technological performance will be dependent on its incidence on the macro,
sectoral and micro  elements that affect OACK conditions (opportunity,
appropriability, cumulativeness and knowledge-based conditions) in the
behavioural dimension, which is the abstract locus where decisions are shaped.
  Importance of macro behaviour: The macro behaviour that prevailed in Argentina
at the time of liberalisation separated economic from technological performance
as two distinct outcomes with different (sometimes opposite) characteristics.
Firms that were successful at product and process innovation (i.e. technological
performance) replicated the same patterns that characterised technological
behaviour. However, patterns of successful economic performance diverged
from them and did not necessarily amount to an efficiency criterion.4
The paper is divided into three major parts and a conclusion. The first part critically
discusses the main theoretical arguments that relate trade liberalisation to efficiency
and long-term growth. The second part develops a model for technological behaviour
and liberalisation in the light of the Schumpeterian literature and illustrates it with
empirical information on the Argentinean case. Part three provides a broader picture of
technological and economic performance based on the analysis of macro-micro
behavioural links in Argentina after trade liberalisation. Finally, the conclusions
summarise the results and formulate exploratory propositions on possible
consequences of the changing macro environment after devaluation.5
1. Trade: opportunities and challenges in the long-run
1.1 The case for free trade
Import liberalisation is usually thought of as a way of eliminating price distortions. This
favours an optimal allocation of production factors and optimal distribution of
commodities; therefore improvements in inter-industry efficiency can be expected.
Furthermore, cost reduction tends to have a cumulative effect through its spillover
effects via input/output relationships [Balassa, 1988].
In addition, it is widely argued that liberalisation increases industrial sector efficiency by
preventing domestic producers enjoying monopoly rents, which usually result in
excessive size and technical inefficiency. Trade reform not only generates competition
that should discipline producers and improve technical efficiency, but also enlarges
markets and thus opens up the possibility of reaping scale economies through making
better use of the capacity. In other words, the elimination of monopoly rents through
openness might bring intra-industry efficiency.
However, some caveats must be considered. First, the embodiment of technology in
capital, skills and organisation of work implies that the reallocation of factors into more
favoured activities is difficult and should not simply be assumed. This may create an
unbalanced situation between creation and destruction after liberalisation, which might
result in wasted resources. Secondly, in a context of information asymmetries and
imperfect markets it is not necessarily true that the most inefficient firms quit the market
while the efficient ones remain
1. Finally, inter-industry efficiency could contradict the
realisation of intra-industry efficiency in practical terms. Given that capacity utilization in
developing countries relies on the availability of imports of inputs and capital assets,
inter-industry reallocation could inhibit the achievement of intra-industry efficiency in a
context of balance of payments constraints. As Helleiner [1993] argues, “liberalisation
of imports is generally considered likely to increase allocative gains but, if it increases
the proportion of free foreign exchange that is spent on non-critical inputs, as it
probably will, it may reduce those relating to capacity utilization in a foreign exchange
constrained economy”. Within a culture of consumerism, the increase in imports of
luxury goods could make this restriction especially relevant.
Having said this, there is not much controversy on these static approaches to trade
questions, and it is largely agreed that liberalisation is beneficial for both inter- and
intra-industry efficiency.
This research is mainly focused on a more controversial relationship. It will investigate
whether trade reforms benefit or reduce technological accumulation. According to
certain dynamic approaches, grounded in neoclassical views of economics, it could be
argued that free trade is a positive incentive for technological change that would affect
long-run growth. Some of the mechanisms are:
  Communication: International exchange opens channels of communication that
facilitate the transmission of technical information [World Bank, 1992]. This faster
accumulation of knowledge implies a more rapid reduction in the cost of production
[Grossman and Helpman, 1991].
  Replenishment: International markets open access to up-to-date knowledge bases
[Atiyas, Dutz and Frischtak, 1992] and enable entrepreneurs to introduce new
varieties at a faster pace [Grossman and Helpman, 1991].
                                                
1 I will return to this point, very much rooted in a behavioural approach, when analysing the Argentinean case in
Section 3.6
  Competition: International competition could encourage the use of new and
distinctive ideas and technologies in production [Balassa, 1988]. It also reduces
duplication [Grossman and Helpman, 1991].
  Externalities: Access to higher technology products creates spillover effects on
knowledge [Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995].
  Human capital: Integration enlarges human capital resources that can be allocated
to research. Given that the research sector exhibits increasing returns to scale, the
rate of growth increases [Romer, 1990].
  Source of imitation: Most firms in developing countries innovate by imitating the
innovations in products and processes made by other firms, usually located in the
developed world. One of the main sources of this kind of innovation is importing
capital goods that embody new technology [Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995; Obstfeld
and Rogoff, 1996].
1.2 The criticism of free trade
The idea that openness is an unequivocally good means for technological development
has been queried. There exists a whole array of critics who would actually find a rationale
for protection or at least some kind of guidance in the process of liberalisation. These
scholars, called the “heretics” by Dosi and Soete [1988], belong to different schools of
thought and consequently their contributions are not necessarily integrated. This criticism
has been classified here into two groups: one that emphasises the importance of
indigenous capabilities, which could be threatened by early liberalisation, and another
that objects to specialisation that relies merely on (existing) factor endowments.
Actually both would proclaim that only a strategic liberalisation is dynamically beneficial.
Arguably, such a policy should commit itself to indigenous technological accumulation
and must prioritise certain activities against others.
The capability approach criticises neoclassical views of innovation for being very weak in
their conceptualisation of technology. It is now widely recognised that technological
change is not a mechanical process where firms select what they need from a
“technology shelf” or from an independent research sector. Therefore, even when trade
does enlarge the external source of knowledge available for trading countries, it does
not imply that they will upgrade their technology skills. Information might flow faster, but
the “ability to produce or replicate innovative results is much more sticky” [Dosi, 1988].
One of the main reasons that justifies this type of argument is that imitation does not
inevitably follow innovation, and even when it does it may not be immediate. The time
element arises because indigenous knowledge needs to have been developed
previously. Not only should imitators know how to select and to adapt the imported
technology to local circumstances [Fransman, 1985], but also they should know how to
decode the instructions and transform them into effective and efficient routines and
processes [Nelson, 1987].
This capacity to innovate is intrinsically associated with the historic accumulation of
knowledge inside the firm, and the allocative process that trade liberalisation is meant
to generate could militate against that accumulation. A great part of the know-how
might evaporate along with the disappearance of the firms that have produced it.
Moreover, the closure of firms also destroys backward and forward linkages that have
been working hitherto. This, of course, further damages the accumulation of knowledge
that is required to innovate [Katz, 2000]. Lall [1993] goes even further along this line of7
argument in suggesting that the costs of protecting capital goods producers may well
be offset in dynamic economies by the technological benefits yielded by a close
interaction between users and producers.
Even some of those who openly support free trade as a way to increase technological
accumulation become more cautious when referring to imitation. Grossman and
Helpman [1991], for instance, make the point that in order for the imitation to be
profitable, “the imitator must be able to earn positive profits in competition with the
original inventor”, and “the enforcement of any applicable patents must not be so strict
as to make imitation prohibitively expensive”. These conditions may be difficult to
satisfy in a highly open economy.
Furthermore, the same authors in another study [Grossman and Helpman, 1993] note
the case that, when technological spillovers are national in scope, the long-run growth
would be faster in that country if it is allowed to “catch up before fully exposing itself to
world competition”.
To sum up, upgrading technologies requires time, especially in developing countries
where innovative activities are characterised by imitation and incremental
improvements. Thus, information flows are not enough to guarantee convergence in
technological capabilities.
Related arguments have given rise to views favouring infant industry protection (e.g.
List [1904]) and also the ‘dependency school’ in Latin America. Development according
to these views was seen as a “chain of disequilibria” created by demand
complementarity and external economies, mainly present in manufacturing production.
Openness, in turn, was seen as offering a threat of becoming stuck in the production of
primary products, in which developing countries had comparative advantages.
Specialising in agriculture, despite being a “natural” international equilibrium, would
mean withdrawing resources from manufacturing which, given its features (learning by
doing, backward and forward linkages, etc.), constituted the real engine of growth. The
role for policy makers was to struggle against this equilibrium: “growth sequences are
likely to exhibit tendencies toward convergence or potentialities of divergence, and
development policy is largely concerned with the prevention of too rapid convergence
and with the promotion of the possibilities of divergence” [Hirschman, 1958].
These ideas link the discussion to the second theme used here to classify the
“heretical” arguments on trade liberalisation. That is, the appropriateness of
specialisation should be evaluated in dynamic terms. Or in other words, the “allocative
patterns induced by international trade have dynamic implications which may yield
either “virtuous” or “perverse” feedbacks in the long-term” [Dosi and Soete, 1988].
A structuralist approach would suggest that there are supply and demand attributes of
certain sectors that make them more interesting than others. Any country, thus, should
attempt to specialise in those if it is committed to increasing its catch-up potential. On
the one hand, some sectors have higher income elasticities of demand. On the other
hand, some sectors show higher elasticity of technology supply (i.e. more technological
opportunities). Moreover, some sectors are more able to absorb technological spillovers
than others
2. Arguably, a country that favoured a group of industries that exhibited such
advantages would be altering permanently the economy’s comparative advantages
and, in turn, raising its output.
                                                
2 For instance, Rodrik [1992] argues that activities with scale economies are generally import-competing, and
therefore intervention in these sectors could be justified when they generate spillover effects to other sectors (as long
as its marginal costs are below the international marginal price).8
These arguments are largely based on Kaldorian lines [Dalum, Laursen and
Verspagen, 1999; Dixon and Thirlwall, 1975; Fagerberg, Verspagen and von
Tunzelmann, 1994; McCombie and Thirlwall, 1995] and Pasinetti’s [1981] theory of
growth. Particularly in Pasinetti, the more similar the country’s sectoral structure is to
the sectoral structure of the leaders, the higher will be the degree of catching up. If we
reverse the causation, we will find the structuralist approach: a country that wants to
develop continuously should copy the sectoral structure of the leaders.
However, the findings of economic history suggest that the best possible sectoral
structure was not always the same as that of the leaders. (e.g. Gerschenkron [1962]).
Given that latecomers could concentrate their production in the most dynamic sectors
(without the sacrifices that such resolution would have created in more advanced
countries), the situation that emerged from the process of development was one where
followers did not look like their models, either in speed of growth or in sectoral structure.
Nevertheless, due to the larger gap between the advanced nations and the developing
countries during most recent industrialisations, and the reinforcement of new
technological barriers, it has not been possible for the newest latecomers to access the
most dynamic technologies.
To sum up, according to these views current market prices as for instance generated by
free trade do not necessarily provide the right incentives for resource allocation in the
long-run. Therefore if a country attempts to improve its dynamic competitiveness it
might be worth guiding the liberalisation process towards the enhancement of more
dynamic activities.
However the issue is more complex than simply favouring or distrusting free trade as a
pathway to growth as suggested above.9
2. Technological Micro Behaviour and Liberalisation
2.1 The theoretical model
2.1.1  Diversity in micro responses: OACK conditions
It could be argued that the attitudes of firms towards technological upgrading stem from
models of behaviour that depend on conditions of opportunity, appropriability,
cumulativeness and knowledge base (hereafter referred to as OACK conditions)
[Breschi, Malerba and Orsenigo, 2000], which largely guide the search activities that
firms pursue in order to improve their current technology.
Technological  opportunity refers, on the one hand, to the technological potential of
improving production and the effectiveness of R+D spending in promoting such
potential. On the other hand, the technological aspect of opportunity has to be reflected
in some market opportunity, in the sense that demand for such a rise in technical
performance must exist.
The knowledge base refers to both the degree of progress in understanding the specific
technology, and the characteristics of knowledge (e.g. tacit or codified, simple or
complex, generic or specific, etc.).
Conditions of appropriability are derived from the public or private good attributes of
technology. Technology is generally regarded as non-rival and only partially excludable
(depending on the institutional system). It follows that a price-taker firm will not be able
to reward technology of this nature and, therefore, innovative activities become
threatened. For this reason, only when innovation is rewarded by quasi-rents (the
appropriability condition) do innovators have the incentive to take on these activities. In
a developed context, this is coupled with the possibility of effectively protecting
innovation from imitation. In a development context, by contrast, high appropriability
conditions are associated with the possibility for local innovators to appropriate the
returns of “good ideas” in the production sphere that enable them to compete against
(usually) more advanced foreign producers of technology. On the one hand, this goes
together with the existence of some (only) locally appropriable advantage. On the other
hand, any local innovative potential will be fully exploited only when barriers to access
to financial resources are not too important. Therefore, we could argue that
appropriability conditions in developing countries are enhanced for firms that rely for
their production on resources that are mainly locally available, or for firms that enjoy the
necessary micro determinants to have smooth access to capital markets.
Conditions of cumulativeness of past experience are given when there exist
advantages for those who have already innovated; or, in other words, when innovations
today generate a stream of new innovations in the future. This has to do with market
and technological characteristics of the industry (e.g. increasing returns, ease of
search, routinisation opportunities, possibility of improving technology incrementally,
technological complexity, etc.), and with learning dynamics (past experience builds up
knowledge for future developments).
It is my contention that these conditions constitute the stick and carrot in technological
behaviour. There are enough reasons to assume that the stronger the OACK conditions
the greater will be the chance to develop technological strategies:
Firstly, conditions of technological opportunities and large knowledge bases constitute a
necessary starting point to develop any strategy towards technological upgrading10
(Graph 1).
Secondly, as argued above, the principal patterns of innovation in developing countries
are imitation and incremental improvements on available technology, which are
positively related to the historic accumulation of knowledge inside the firm.
Furthermore, accumulation of knowledge is in part the result of production experience
(i.e. cumulativeness), but this passive learning explains only a small part of the ability to
incorporate new technology effectively. Deliberate capability-building efforts are
necessary, but costly and risky. Therefore, a firm’s financial capacity is important and
sometimes determinant to pursuing innovative activities through creative imitation. In
order to pursue internal efforts in technology, imitators must expect profits that exceed
those they would get when relying on external sources.
Thus, to follow an indigenous technological strategy the development context imposes
a minimum level of appropriability, which is perhaps larger than in advanced countries
(Graph 2).
To sum up, as shown in Graph 1 and 2, conditions of opportunity, knowledge base and
cumulativeness would continuously increase the likelihood of pursuing technological
strategies across the industrial structure as a whole. Conditions of appropriability would
also have a positive impact on technological behaviour, though it could be argued that
there would be a turning point when excessive appropriability conditions make
monopolies or oligopolies choose a “quiet life” over innovative activity, which entails risk
and uncertainty
3.
2.1.2 Impact of liberalisation on OACK conditions
In this section the effect of different degrees of liberalisation on OACK conditions will be
hypothesised, which, as argued just above, will in turn directly influence the likelihood of
a firm pursuing a technological strategy. Arguments will be borrowed from the two main
approaches to the relation between trade and technology identified in Part 1. As will be
seen below, within this framework, arguments from both supporters and critics of free
trade could hold true
                                                
3 Indeed, as seen in Part 1, this is one of the arguments in favour of liberalisation.
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When an economy is opened to trade, new technological opportunities that were once
lacking become available and arguably the knowledge base expands. This could have
a positive impact on the technological potential of users of technology. However,
sectors that suffered especial contraction after liberalisation were usually those that
produce technology, and given the importance of technological spillovers that could be
generated due to the user-producer relation, liberalisation could also imply a decrease
in technological opportunity and a contraction of the knowledge base.
Moreover, market opportunity does not necessarily increase as a consequence of
liberalisation. On the one hand, import liberalisation does not imply a better
performance in exports, as is usually assumed. In point of fact, import restrictions do
not necessarily mean preventing the taking advantage of exports
4. On the other hand,
the process of creative destruction should not simply be assumed either. Usually
protected sectors will contract before those that are advantaged after the reforms are
established and expanded.
However, for the interim, I will take as valid the arguments from free trade supporters
and predict a positive effect of trade liberalisation on conditions of opportunity and
knowledge base (Graph 3). Nevertheless, a negative impact of liberalisation will be
predicted on conditions of cumulativeness and appropriability in a development context
(Graph 4).
Firstly, in a context where technological and industrial policies are weak and capital
markets are very imperfect, local firms are unable to perform costly indigenous efforts.
They have to compete against the original innovators, or against highly competitive
multinational companies, or against imports in general. Thus, they might prefer to adopt
disembodied technology transferred from abroad, rather than encouraging the risk of
spending on innovation inside the firm. This militates against national appropriability,
given that foreign suppliers of technology will capitalise on the benefits that its use
generates.
Secondly, the reallocation process after trade liberalisation usually involves the closure
of firms and thus backward and forward linkages necessarily deteriorate. Thus, given
the absence of complementary technological safeguards, it may be stated that the
accumulation of knowledge also declines with liberalisation.
                                                
4 As is well documented, most export booms in developing countries were experienced before trade liberalisation
had been attempted (Korea and Taiwan in the 1960s, Brazil in the late 1960s, and Turkey in the 1980s) ([Rodrik,
1992].
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Therefore, while liberalisation may be expected to have a positive effect on conditions
of  opportunity and knowledge base, it may have a negative one on conditions of
cumulativeness and appropriability.
Arguably, the former relation is stronger at early stages of liberalisation when the local
market is flooded with new technologically advanced varieties of inputs and capital
goods that may not require much adaptation. Thus, adoption of technology
opportunities is fairly easy and therefore opportunities on the demand side are also
high. By contrast, as the country gets closer to a situation of complete free trade, easily
adaptable technological opportunities become exhausted and further complexity
prevents a rapid adoption of remaining technological opportunities; therefore the rate of
growth decreases accordingly.
On the other hand, long-lasting effects of past technological accumulation and past
routinisation of activities flatten the decrease of cumulativeness and appropriability
conditions at early stages of liberalisation, while technologically specific factors slow
down the process once close to a situation of free trade.
2.1.3  Impact of liberalisation on technological decisions
At this stage, the above lines of reasoning could be linked to analyse the overall impact
of liberalisation on the likelihood of pursuing a technological strategy. Graph 5 charts
separately the positive and negative effects of opportunity and knowledge base on the
one hand, and appropriability and cumulativeness on the other. These two effects could
be thought of as a re-interpretation of the main hypotheses that classify arguments for
and against trade liberalisation from a dynamic perspective. On the one hand, the
supporters of free trade propositions are summarised in the positive impact that
liberalisation has on technological behaviour through new technological opportunities
that widen the knowledge base. On the other, the adverse perspective is shown in the
downward sloping curve that sketches the negative effect caused by sacrificing
cumulativeness and indigenous appropriability, which has been the main justification for
infant industry protection.
Graph 6 draws the total outcome assuming that both effects are weighted equally
5 in
technological behaviour. As is clear in the graph, liberalisation in the early stages has
marked positive effects on technological decisions, given by both the new technological
opportunities and the response induced by competition. However, as liberalisation
proceeds, this positive effect is overtaken by the negative effect on appropriability and
cumulativeness.
                                                
5 The actual form of this curve will depend, of course, not only on the weights of the two curves presented in Graph
5, but also on their slopes, which will in turn depend on the institutions that characterise the country under analysis.13
The empirical evidence on the performance dimension
6 that links trade policy with
productivity gains in developing countries reviewed by Havrylyshyn [1990] seems to
validate this argument, given that it shows that neither extreme in trade liberality is good
for productivity growth. Actually, the countries with better outcomes in productivity are
those with intermediate degrees of liberalisation.
2.2   Empirical illustration
Optimally, I would need to assess the impact of trade on those conditions in order to
draw conclusions about behavioural patterns. However, there are methodological
problems that rule out this possibility. Firstly, those conditions are primarily theoretical
entities that are very difficult to proxy with empirical indicators. Secondly, although one
could attempt to measure behaviour directly using innovation surveys, which address
motivational aspects of the process of innovation, these surveys do not allow
longitudinal analysis given that in Argentina they were carried out only once (1997) and
the coverage period starts after liberalisation. Thirdly, liberalisation was completed
suddenly in 1991; consequently, the country passed from protection towards (almost)
free trade without pause, which leaves no option to look for the existence of a point like
C in Graph 6.
Therefore, instead of analysing empirically the effect of liberalisation on OACK
conditions (that will in turn impact on innovative behaviour), the problem will be
approached from the opposite direction, by looking deeply into innovative strategies
after liberalisation in an attempt to disentangle the main patterns that could enable
reconstruction of the initial causes.
This methodology requires a set of assumptions. Firstly, it will be assumed that the
endogenous growth theory premises on the positive impact of liberalisation on
technological opportunity and knowledge base are valid (Graph 3). Secondly, it will be
assumed that large and foreign firms necessarily enjoyed appropriability conditions.
Thirdly, it will also be assumed that mature firms and those that largely invest in R&D
                                                
6 Despite the empirical support of this evidence, it should be recalled that the model presented here is based on the
behavioural dimension whose translation to performance is neither deterministic (i.e the whole process is imbued
with uncertainty and randomness) nor unidirectional (i.e. there is no single causality in the relation of behaviour to
performance).
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enjoyed a greater degree of cumulativeness conditions than otherwise. Finally, the
commodity sector is assumed to be technologically less dynamic than the other sectors,
whereas the durable good sector and the diffuser of technological progress sector are
technologically more dynamic
7.
The organisation of this empirical part proceeds at follows. First, using latent class
analysis, innovative strategies will be identified on the basis of information on behaviour
provided by the National Survey of Technological Behaviour (‘The Survey’)
8. The
second sub-section will analyse what factors have originated those strategies, with an
explicit emphasis on trade determinants.
2.2.1  Identification of strategies
i) Data, definitions and methodology
The Survey includes information on innovative strategies: firms were asked (question
220) to stipulate the importance of eight types of innovative activities using a 1-3 scale:
A. Product  innovation
B. Process  innovation
C. Renewal  of  machinery
D. Labour  reorganisation
E.  Production process reorganisation
F. Continuous  improvements
G. Costs rationalisation
H. Training
These eight ordinal variables involve firms’ perceptions and arguably should be highly
interrelated. However, there is no reason to suggest any particular causality among
them; rather the underlying relationship is likely to state some unobserved
characteristics of firms’ strategies.
Arguably, we could think of two different innovative strategies in the aftermath of
liberalisation for those firms that actually react proactively to the change in the
environment
9.
On the one hand, being concerned about the increase in competition, firms might have
targeted their technical efficiency by restructuring their production organisation. These
are the static once-for-all gains that are usually associated with the increase in
competition imposed by trade liberalisation that would induce them to adopt techniques
in concomitance with factor endowments and improve their efficiency.  This strategy will
be called here the organisational strategy.
On the other hand, firms might have benefited from technological spillovers (of the type
suggested by endogenous growth theory) and could have attempted to develop a
technological strategy. This strategy, on the contrary, pursues long-term efficiency.
                                                
7 See Appendix 1 for definition of different sectors, based on Ferraz, Rush and Miles [1992].
8 The Survey includes 1639 firms. It was produced jointly by the National Institute of Statistics and Censuses
(INDEC) and the Secretary of Science and Technology (SECyT) for Argentina, with the fieldwork carried out during
1997. Due to the methodology used and the size of the sample, the data, once extrapolated, depict the Argentinean
industrial sector as a whole.
9 However, as will be argued in Part 3 of this paper, the average behaviour after liberalisation was not focused on
productive activities but on shorter term activities aiming at survival. These firms could actually take their resources
out of the productive system and devote them to managerial, commercial or even speculative activities. Firms
belonging to that group were very likely to be among those that inflated to 60% the proportion of non-respondents to
at least one of the items included in question 220 from The Survey.15
Table 2a: Descriptive Statistics on the Importance of Different Innovative Activities
Source: Author’s calculation based on The Survey.
Factor analysis could be used to discover those underlying dimensions. However, the
data here are categorical and therefore do not meet the properties of parametric data to
use such techniques. Instead, latent class analysis, which is used for categorical data
as an analogue to factor analysis [McCutcheon and Mills, 1998], is adopted. A latent
class model is like a log-linear model that estimates an n-way contingency table, but
with that table including latent (unobserved) variables.
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where F is the three-way (observed) frequency table. The natural logarithm of F could
be described as a linear combination of a grand mean, three marginal effects, three
two-way association effects, and one three-way association effect. This is the
unrestricted model, which could be used as a starting point for testing restrictions
stemming from the research hypothesis.
In this case, my hypothesis is that the eight indicators mentioned above actually
represent some other more encompassing factors, namely two latent variables that
define either a low/high organisational strategy or a low/high technological strategy.
A latent variable model then adds one or more latent variables to the log-linear model.
These latent variables are hypothesised to control for the association between the
indicators, and therefore once they are included, the remaining relations among
indicators could only originate by chance. Therefore, the latent class model imposes the
restriction of independent classification errors, which implies that all higher-order terms
that combine indicator variables are set to zero. The above model with one latent
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Here there are eight indicator variables, each of them of dimension 4 (recall that firms
have to grade the importance of each of them using a scale from 1-3, but one extra
category needs to be included for missing information: 1 for missing values, 2 for
scores 1, 3 for scores 2, and 4 for scores 3). How many latent variables could be
extracted from them? This is something that should be decided a-priori based on the
research hypothesis. Of course, different models can be contrasted using the
evaluation criteria that will be mentioned below, but the main motivation to perform
latent class analysis is the idea that some common dimension must have guided similar
Descriptive Statistics
997 1.00 3.00 1.9829 .7175
968 1.00 3.00 1.9928 .7140
1088 1.00 3.00 1.9963 .7589
919 1.00 3.00 1.8303 .6808
786 1.00 3.00 1.6298 .7024
880 1.00 3.00 1.8557 .7097
1048 1.00 3.00 2.0458 .6798




m220c: renewal of machinery
m220d: labour reorganisation





N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation16
response patterns.
My hypothesis is that two different behaviours characterised the post-liberalisation
period: one based on an organisational innovation strategy and another based on a
technological innovation strategy.  There are still two more things to decide before
estimating the model. First is the distribution of the indicator variables between the two
latent variables. While this draws mainly on the preceding discussion, alternatives using
evaluation criteria will also be considered. Secondly, it is necessary to define
beforehand how many classes (the analogue of categories in indicators) the latent
variables have. In the absence of an a-priori alternative, the most parsimonious
alternative will be chosen, as usually recommended [McCutcheon and Mills, 1998].
That is, I will hypothesise that firms are either low-innovative or high-innovative (in both
technological and organisational terms).
ii)  Estimation and evaluation procedures
LEM software, based on the EM (expectation maximisation) algorithm, which is a two-
step procedure, is used for the estimation. In the first step (E), it calculates the
expected value of the log-likelihood, based on initial values for the parameters. In the
second step (M) the log-likelihood is maximised and the obtained parameters are used
as initial values for a new round of the E step. The model is therefore solved by
iteration.
There are different evaluation methods, all of which compare the expected with the
observed frequencies. Four of them are widely used: the Pearson Chi-Square (χ
2), the
likelihood ratio chi square (L
2), the Akaike information criterion (AIC), and the Bayesian
information criterion (BIC). The first two have an asymptotic chi-square distribution with
respect to the degrees of freedom, thus a good fit will exist when the p-value
approaches 1. The AIC criterion penalises the number of parameters to be estimated
(because more parameters yield a greater likelihood regardless of the quality of the
model), while the BIC criterion also penalises sample size, because the first two criteria
are usually quite conservative when sample sizes are large (modest models appear to





The rule is thus to choose models with lower AIC and BIC criteria.
iii) Model estimation for innovative strategies
As stated above, the latent class model that will be estimated here has two latent
variables and eight indicators. One latent variable represents a technological innovation
strategy and the other an organisational innovation strategy. The next step is to define
which are the best indicators to measure each of them. Basically, indicators A, B and C
should be in one of them (technological strategy) and D and E in the other
(organisational strategy). With regard to the rest, arguments could be found to locate
them in one or the other. The following options groups are what I consider sensible
alternatives:17
Table 2b: Models for Latent Variables
Initially these five models were estimated, all of them with 2 latent variables (X and Y)
with 2 classes each (t=r=2). None of the models showed a good fit to the data and an
analysis of the residuals (not shown here) suggested that all the above models
underestimate the number of missing values, especially when none of the indicator
variables were answered (A=B=C=D=E=F=G=H=I=1).
Therefore, the model was re-estimated using three-dimensional latent variables.
However, one of these dimensions is needed to state the absence of strategy, therefore
the probability that class 1 of both latent variables belongs to positive (no missing)
responses was set to 0%. Therefore, there will be one class that absorbs the
systematic missing responses and only those. The other two classes of each latent
variable will be interpreted as low or high strategy.
Table 2c: Information Criteria for the Models
.
Source: Author’s calculation based on The Survey
The five models fit the data, thus their information criteria need to be compared to
evaluate their relative performance, as in Table 2c. As can be seen, both criteria point
to model 4 as the most suitable for these data. Actually, the distribution of indicators in
model 4 is the same as would have been discriminated using factor analysis.  The first
thing to notice is that by means of latent class analysis, the information data are
reduced from eight four-dimensional variables into two three-dimensional ones, in a
meaningful way. Furthermore, contrary to factor analysis I could also use non-
responses as valuable information.
2.2.2 The determinants of innovative strategies
The previous identification of innovative strategies will be used here to estimate an
ordered probit model that defines their salient determinants. Technological strategy is
measured as the sum of scores a firm assigned to product innovation, process
innovation and renewal of machinery (activities A, B & C); while organisational strategy
is measured as the sum of scores assigned to training, cost rationalisation, labour re-
Model  Indicators for Technological strategy  Indicators for Organisational strategy 
1  A, B, C, F  D, E, G, H 
2  A, B, C, F, H  D, E, G 
3  A, B, C, G  D, E, F 
4  A, B, C  D, E, F, G, H 
5  A, B, C, F, G  D, E, H 
 






BIC criteria  AIC criteria 
1  A, B, C, F  D, E, G, H  -482572  -128783 
2  A, B, C, F, H  D, E, G  -482519  -128723 
3  A, B, C, G  D, E, F  -482558  -128765 
4  A, B, C  D, E, F, G, H  -482618  -128825 
5  A, B, C, F, G  D, E, H  -482552  -128758 
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organisation, production process re-organisation and continuous improvements
(activities D, E, F, G & H)
10.
Tables 2d and 2e present the results of an ordered probit regression on both strategies.
Table 2d: Ordered Probit Regression on Technological Strategy
                                                
10 Given that firms were asked to grade each activity with a score from 1 to 3, technological strategy grades from 0 to
9 and organisational strategy grades from 0 to 15. Score 0 corresponds to non-respondents, which amounts to 49%
for technological strategy and 58% for organisational strategy.
 
N 1607
Dep. Variable: Technological Strategy  Pseudo R2 0.0513
Ind. Variables  Coef.  Sig.  .       z 
Commodities -0.339392***  -4.17
Food Commodities  -0.069240  -0.57
Diffuser -0.081920  -0.88
Durable Goods  0.181974*  1.79
RD Avg. 92-96  0.000410*  1.68
Other Inn. Activities (production) Avg. 92-96  0.000540*  1.73
Other Inn. Activities (management) Avg. 92-96 0.000651  1.31
Transfer of Technology Avg. 92-96  0.000085  1.46
Expo Avg. 92-96  -0.000004**  -2.05
Import of Capital Goods Avg. 92-96  0.000068***  2.72
Import of Inputs Avg. 92-96  -0.000005  -1.15
Imports of Final Products Avg. 92-96  -0.000009  -1.64
Imports of Services Avg 92-96  -0.000113  -0.94
Decentralised Information  0.113189***  7.75
Centralised Information  0.043057***  3.77
Size   0.273293  1.6
Age 0.003275***  2.6
Foreign 0.261973***  3.54
Sales 96  0.000002**  2.5
*** Significant at 99%, ** Significant at 95%, *Significant at 90% 
Source: Author’s calculation based on The Survey. 19
Table 2e: Ordered Probit Regression on Organisational Strategy
Variable definition
RD Avg. 92-96: includes expenditures on Basic Research, Applied Research and Development of New Products and Processes
measured in thousands of pesos 1peso=1US$
Other Inn. Activities (production) Avg. 92-96: includes expenditures on Adaptation of Products and Processes, Technical
Assistance to Production and Project Engineering. It is measured in thousands of pesos  1peso=1US$
Other Inn. Activities (management) Avg. 92-96: includes expenditures on Administrative Reorganisation, General Organisation, and
Commercialisation of new products. It is measured in thousands of pesos  1peso=1US$
Transfers of technology Avg. 92-96: Includes expenditures on licences, patents and technical assistance paid to private firms inside
or outside the country. It is measured in thousands of pesos  1peso=1US$
Exports Avg. 92_96: firm exports. Average 1992-1996. Measured in thousands of US$ FOB.
Import of Capital Goods Avg. 92_96: firm imports of capital goods. Average 1992-1996. Measured in thousands of US$ CIF.
Import of Inputs Avg. 92_96: firm imports of inputs. Average 1992-1996. Measured in thousands of US$ CIF.
Import of Final Products Avg. 92_96: firm imports of final products. Average 1992-1996. Measured in thousands of US$ CIF.
Import of Services Avg. 92_96: firm imports of services. Average 1992-1996. Measured in thousands of US$ CIF.
Decentralised information: The three most important (ranking from 1 to 3) sources of information available in the market: a) from
competitors; b) from clients; c) from suppliers; d) from reverse engineering  Ordinal variable 0-6
Centralised information: The three most important (ranking from 1 to 3) sources of information available from research institutions:
a) from universities; b) public research organisations; c) private research organisations; d) seminars, conferences and expositions;
e) publications; f) technology centres  Ordinal variable 0-6
Size: firm sales over industry sales (5 digit ISIC)
Age: 1997-year of foundation of the firm
Foreign: Dummy variable that equals 1 when the firm has foreign participation and 0 otherwise
Sales 96: firm sales measured in thousands of pesos 1peso=1US$
These empirical results will be discussed in the light of the theoretical discussion in Part
2.1. Although results on technological strategy and organisational strategy are quite
similar, I will concentrate the discussion mainly on the former given that the goal of the
paper is to analyse the impact of trade liberalisation on long-term efficiency.
N 1607
Dep. Variable: Organisational Strategy  Pseudo R2 0.0555
Ind. Variables  Coef.  Sig.  .       z 
Commodities -0.211216**  -2.51
Food Commodities  -0.344013**  -2.54
Diffuser 0.153081  1.61
Durable Goods  0.318091***  3.06
RD Avg. 92-96  0.000522**  2.16
Other Inn. Activities (production) Avg. 92-96  0.000395**  2.05
Other Inn. Activities (management) Avg. 92-96 -0.000056  -0.11
Transfer of Technology Avg. 92-96  0.000056  1.05
Expo Avg. 92-96  -0.000003  -1.54
Import of Capital Goods Avg. 92-96  0.000015  0.66
Import of Inputs Avg. 92-96  -0.000003  -0.82
Imports of Final Products Avg. 92-96  -0.000005  -1.01
Imports of Services Avg 92-96  -0.000565***  -2.81
Decentralised Information  0.096925***  6.4
Centralised Information  0.033122***  2.83
Size   0.284025  1.62
Age 0.003096**  2.35
Foreign 0.470414***  6.22
Sales 96  0.000003***  3.79
*** Significant at 99%, ** Significant at 95%, *Significant at 90% 
Source: Author’s calculation based on The Survey. 
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i) Trade as an incentive for technological dynamism: the endogenous growth
theory claim
Imports of inputs apparently did not encourage innovative behaviour; however an
appropriate assessment of the importance of inputs for the creation of externalities in
technology should consider only new (or highly technological) inputs, which is not the
case here.
More encouraging results for free-trade supporters are found in relation to capital goods
and market information flows, both arguably favoured by liberalisation policies and
significant for explaining technological strategy. Thus, it seems to be the case that
openness did create new opportunities, either embodied in capital goods or in newly
available technological information, which induced a renewed interest in technology.
Unfortunately, only the supply side is analysed here because those imports were
actually ordered directly by the industrial firms. That is, there is no analysis of the fact
that these new imports also displaced local production of those inputs and capital
goods elsewhere, which (especially the latter) had historically led technological
production in the country.
Actually, sectoral dummies support a structuralist approach. Once sources of micro
diversity and sales are controlled for, industrial sectors that were openly supported
during ISI (Industrialisation by Substitution of Imports), and subsequently punished as a
consequence of trade liberalisation, were, technologically speaking, the most dynamic
sectors. Thus, in comparison to the traditional sector, firms from the Durable Goods
sector were significantly more concerned about innovation. On the other hand, the
Commodity and the Food Commodity sectors, which based their competitiveness on
natural resources and were winning sectors during the 1990s
11, were, as usual, not
very interested in innovation.
Moreover, rather than encouraging a technological attitude that could increase national
competitiveness, exports seem to affect negatively the likelihood of pursuing a
technological strategy, which could be interpreted as an excessive emphasis on static,
rather than dynamic, comparative advantage. This is plausibly the result of some
omitted variable related to international specialisation in products (across different
sectors) that were not particularly dynamic in technological terms. This, in turn, could be
a consequence of a policy emphasis on static advantages.
However, the ambiguity of effects of variables related to liberalisation does not prevent
some firms from being positively affected by liberalisation, even in technological terms.
For instance, liberalisation induced technological dynamism in the form of newly
available information and capital goods, at least for some firms. My hypothesis,
however, is that behavioural diversity hampered an overall positive effect. This diversity
was given by the different degree of conditions of cumulativeness and appropriability
that different typologies of firms could enjoy.
ii) Importance of appropriability and cumulativeness conditions: the heretic claim
Oldness and nationality seem to be advantageous for following either an organisational
strategy or a technological strategy. Bigness, in turn, is highly correlated with
nationality; when this latter variable is not included in the model, size becomes highly
significant to explain both strategies.
                                                
11 Empirical evidence on ‘winners and losers’ of trade liberalisation will be presented in Part 3.21
Therefore, firms with many years’ experience and with foreign participation were more
likely to undertake technological efforts. Years of experience could be easily associated
with a natural advantage in cumulativeness. Size and foreign participation, in turn, were
micro determinants that paved the way to capital markets. Therefore, the case could be
advanced that firms that shared these attributes could afford the inherent costs and
risks associated with innovative activities, and therefore they were more likely to be
more competitive in technological terms.
The importance of cumulativeness could also be highlighted by looking at variables
related to the development of indigenous capabilities inside the firm. Technological
efforts inside the firms, particularly R&D and innovative activities related to production,
were fundamental to pursuing both strategies. However, innovative activities related to
management, which have grown steadily during the period as will be discussed in Part
3, were not significant to explain either of the two strategies.
To sum up, firms that took advantage of the newly available technological opportunities
and carried out technological strategies enjoyed conditions of cumulativeness and
appropriability. This was facilitated by certain micro (age, nationality and size) and
sectoral attributes
12. The important point to stress here is that a technological strategy
was not generally adopted because only a certain typology of firms enjoyed all OACK
conditions. Had conditions of cumulativeness and appropriability been equally
enhanced across firms’ typologies, a broader adoption of technological strategies would
have been induced by the new technological opportunities and the broadened
knowledge base that trade liberalisation triggered.
In point of fact, the second claim of this paper is that the macro environment not only
did not enhance OACK conditions in a way that could have increased the proportion of
firms willing to commit to a technological strategy, but also encouraged a behaviour that
discriminated against the long-term. Therefore, firms committed to technological
strategies (which enjoy higher probability of being successful in technological
performance) were not necessarily among the most successful in economic
performance in this macroeconomic environment that rewarded short-term strategies.
This proposition will be discussed in Part 3.
                                                
12 The Commodity sector excluded. Besides, given the path dependent characteristic of technological innovation, it
could be argued (though it was not tested here) that some other firms that have been historically technologically
committed continued to be so. Actually, the significant importance of efforts in R&D could suggest this.22
3.  Technological and Economic Performance after Liberalisation: Analysis
based on Macro Behaviour
Following the empirical findings of the previous section, it could be argued that
opportunities embodied in newly available capital goods and freer market information
encouraged the adoption of innovative strategies. However, it was also shown that
firms would benefit from those opportunities especially when they enjoyed conditions of
appropriability and cumulativeness, otherwise the risks and costs attached to a
technological strategy were too difficult to meet.
A further step in this line of reasoning could be to analyse what happened to those firms
that did not enjoy one or other condition (especially appropriability).
One possible answer, grounded in biological evolution and natural selection [Alchian,
1950], would be that the (now freer) market would select the more efficient firms, and
therefore nothing of importance would be lost in the process. This conventional
conclusion relies exclusively on the performance dimension and does not tackle the
behavioural side
13.
However, it is my contention that, in order to assess the effects of any macro policy on
aggregate performance, it is necessary to analyse the historical pattern of behaviour
across sectors and types of firms in the country under analysis. The literature
emphasises path-dependency at the firm level, but past performance is also important
at the macro level. In other words, national economic and social history will shape
specific patterns of macro behaviour that are reluctant to change even though a current
economic situation signals different attitudes. In point of fact, these mismatches
between current (path-dependent) behaviour and the one that should have prevailed to
sustain the new macro environment, could induce the system to a new (macro)
economic crisis.
Based on analysis on macro behaviour I will argue that the biological metaphor that
claims that an open market will suffice to select the best performing firms by making
inefficiency a terminal disadvantage is not always valid. In a context of high degrees of
structural uncertainty, information asymmetry and imperfect markets (especially capital
markets) it is not necessarily the case that the most inefficient firms leave the market
while the efficient ones remain. Quite the contrary, firms will have higher probabilities of
remaining in the market if they follow a survival attitude unrelated to productive
activities that therefore hampers technological performance. In other words, this paper
claims that there was a divorce between technological and economic performance
which could be largely explained when analysing different patterns of behaviour at
micro, sectoral and macro level.
Section 3.1 will analyse macro patterns of behaviour which are necessary to
contextualise trade reforms historically. The outcome of section 3.1 will be an
identification of different patterns of behaviour across firms’ typologies interacting within
that macro environment. In section 3.2, I will evaluate to what extent and in what
direction those patterns of behaviour affect technological and economic performance.
                                                
13 Therefore, heterogeneity either is considered random or does not exist (all agents are rational and follow
strategies that maximise profits).23
3.1  Identification of macro behaviour
3.1.1  Contextualising the reforms
The economic policies carried out in 1978
14 plus the debt crisis during the early 1980s
created such damage in all the macro aggregates that they marked the beginning of a
new mentality in Argentina. At the policy level it was clear that the main priority was to
stabilise the economy. At the micro level, though, there was a general disbelief that
stabilisation was possible. The external and fiscal maladjustments together with
unfavourable micro expectations ended up in the 1989 hyperinflation.
Therefore, by the time of trade reforms, Argentina had passed through more than one
decade (called the “lost decade”) of serious economic problems, only (apparently)
stabilised by the Convertibility Programme. It is not surprising, therefore, that the micro
behaviour has been characterised as guided by an absolute preference for flexibility
[Fanelli and Frenkel, 1996].
Accordingly, at a policy level it was thought that only a dramatic change in policy could
change micro expectations, and trade liberalisation was carried out almost in one effort
during 1991, the same year that the Convertibility stabilisation programme was
launched.
Overvaluation of the local currency implied that firms suddenly had to face the
competitive pressures of new imports without enjoying the benefits of either price or
non-price competitiveness. Consequently exports were virtually unchanged while
imports almost tripled during the first years of the programme’s implementation
15.
Time and liquidity (in American dollars) were especially precious. There were some
firms that, regardless of how efficient they managed to be in their productive activities,
were ‘a-priori’ in a stronger position to survive given their easier access to capital
markets and foreign currency (e.g. big firms, foreign firms, or those that based
production on natural resources). These are referred to as the a-priori chosen firms.
All these macro elements only accentuated a general tendency in behaviour. There
were limited opportunities for proactive strategies: the aim was much less to grow than
to survive. In such an uncertain macro environment selection will not necessarily be
based on efficiency but on the likelihood of surviving the selection process. This is as
circular as it seems.
To make it simpler, in the aftermath of liberalisation firms had two options. The first one
was to react proactively taking advantage of the newly available technological
opportunities. However, not every firm fully enjoyed appropriability and cumulativeness
conditions, which, as discussed in Part 2 are necessary to draw technological
strategies. Besides, the dogmatism in policy design, which reduced to a minimum the
direct incidence of the public sector in the private domain
16, openly avoided the creation
of incentives that might have helped to conserve the capabilities acquired during the
import substitution period
17. Thus, among firms that decided to react proactively, only
                                                
14 Which implied a sharp decrease in industrial activities, so serious that in the 1980s the participation of the
manufacturing sector in total GDP was less than it was in the 1940s. According to statistics of the Central Bank the
participation rate of the manufacturing sector was: 1900-1909 = 15.35%; 1940-1949 = 24.22%; 1960-1969 = 28.18%;
1980-1990 = 23.6% [Kosacoff, 1996].
15 This tendency was reversed in 1995, in part as a result of the recession caused by the Mexican crisis at the end of
1994.
16 Public expenditures nevertheless increased rather than reduced through the 1990s.
17 Except for the automobile sector, that enjoyed special treatment [Katz, 2000b].24
those that enjoyed OACK conditions
18 were to be successful. The a-priori chosen firms
mentioned above clearly enjoyed conditions of appropriability before but especially after
reforms, and therefore they were in a better condition to benefit from the new
environment. The rest, which were made up of heterogeneous firms (e.g. small firms,
firms producing non-traditional products, firms located in remote places, etc.), would
very likely die in their attempts to be proactive
19.
Therefore, rational firms that did not especially enjoy OACK conditions would do better
if they opted for the second option, that is, following a survival strategy that enabled
them to react faster to changing situations.
The faster the reaction, the more likely it would be to remain in the market queuing to
be chosen. Thus, flexibility and rapid reaction were rewarded. This created a series of
short-term strategies that were distinct from innovative strategies, and were usually
even beyond the industrial sphere. Even though they remained conservative in
production techniques, they were nevertheless flexible to survive in changing markets.
They would not risk their survival by adopting innovative strategies that might hamper
their speed of changing activities, because what constituted an advantage at the
present time could be a disadvantage in the near future. I will refer to this behaviour as
an inclination towards malleability. Thus, short-range focused attitudes pre-empted
Schumpeterian responses.
The main point here is, on the one hand, that firms that did better in economic terms
either survived on the basis of short-term strategies that prioritised malleability with
strong emphasis on the ability to adapt quickly to a different macro environment, or
were a-priori chosen. On the other hand, those that did better in technological terms
were firms that did not prioritise malleability and were largely committed to proactive
(innovative) activities. As argued in Part 2, firms that enjoyed appropriability and
cumulativeness are in a better situation to pursue this kind of strategy. Given that a-
priori chosen firms naturally enjoyed appropriability condition, it will be shown below
that they were more able to benefit from the new technological opportunities created
after liberalisation (especially in dynamic sectors).
3.1.2  The Micro Behaviour triggered by Macro Behaviour
In tune with prevailing macro behaviour that prioritised malleability, the principal strategic
reorientation inside the firm after liberalisation was the adoption of a new managerial
model. Financial and administration skills prevailed over technological skills across
management and there was an extraordinary concern for demand-side activities.
This strategy gave firms the capacity to adapt rapidly to the changing environment, and
most importantly, it avoided more expensive, deeper and more permanent restructuring,
such as is commonly necessary in indigenous technological innovation.
As suggested before, this was in part due to a lack of concern by public institutions to
take care of the know-how that had been achieved during the years of ISI. However,
the main point here is that the turnabout in national concerns was especially the
consequence of a dominant behaviour born and fostered under many years of serious
macro uncertainty. Consequently malleability was rewarded at the same time that policy
changes were distrusted.
                                                
18 Assuming that trade liberalisation created new technological opportunities and broadened the knowledge base for
all firms, conditions of appropriability and cumulativeness were to be the ones that drew a dividing line between
successful and unsuccessful firms in technological terms.
19 Of course this is a stylised categorisation and there were exceptions in both directions (see below).25
Survival rather than growth was the aim. Most of the firms that were not a-priori chosen
and therefore found it too difficult to adopt proactive strategies engaged in this
malleability culture. Besides, there were still many of the a-priori chosen that, although
having the choice of acting proactively, opted for the rewards of malleability.
Unfortunately, it is very difficult to delimit theoretically what constitutes a malleable
activity, particularly because, by definition, the wide variety of its manifestations was
permanently changing. Furthermore, malleability strategies, which were sometimes
quite creative, were usually far away from the production sphere. Therefore, it is even
harder to assess malleability empirically given that its manifestations were not strictly
covered by innovation surveys.
Despite these intrinsic limitations, I identified two interrelated patterns of behaviour that
can be associated with a strong commitment to the malleability culture:
i)  Strong reliance on domestic markets
During the ISI period, efforts were predominantly towards imitation and adaptation of
products and process, and therefore internal sources of knowledge were of paramount
importance. Although goods were predominately produced for domestic markets, firms
did not need to perform extraordinary efforts on the demand side because most
markets were captive.
Liberalisation brought specialisation. However, even when firms reduced their
production mix, they did not gain enough competitiveness to compete in international
markets. Most of them continued to rely on domestic demand, and therefore reduced
their production mix without reducing the product mix they marketed. Instead they
complemented their sales with imported products
20. Final products imported by firms
included in The Survey increased by 72%, much more than the 55% of the total
increase of imports (Table 3a). This pattern is also manifested in firms’ sales
disaggregated by producers. Sales of goods that were not produced inside the
industrial firms increased as a share of total sales.
                                                
20 Katz [2000a] argued that these commercial activities constituted one of the outstanding strategies followed by
manufacturing local subsidiaries of MNC (Multinational Companies) after liberalisation. Data from The Survey show
that this could be extrapolated easily also to national firms.26
Table 3a: Sales, Imports and Exports between 1992 and 1996
ii) Innovation related to management
Among indigenous capability efforts, strictly innovative activities, rather than research
and development, gained predominance. Table 3b shows that the rates of growth of
activities related to administration (84%), organisation (86%) and commercialisation
(98%) were well above the average growth rate of innovative efforts inside the firm
(47.5%).
The very low starting point in terms of managerial activities from the ISI period makes
the high growth rate of these activities during the 1990s understandable. However, the
 
N firms / Millions $  1992 
 big  medium  small  TOTAL 
Sales   100  17,816 266 9,641 1,191 7,358 1,557 34,814 
Sales of own production  99  15,664 262 9,072 1,145 6,964 1,506 31,701 
Sales of others’ production  48  2,152 93 568 307 393 448 3,114 
Imports   100  2,711 266 1,228 1,191 693 1,557 4,632 
Imports of capital goods   67  192 146 120 283 127 496 439 
Imports of inputs   76  1,798 178 840 439 427 693 3,065 
Imports of final products   42  704 59 267 119 136 220 1,107 
Imports of services (inc. techno)  6  17 11 1 10 4 27 22 
Exports 100  3,071 266 895 1,191 461 1,557 4,427 
                
N firms / Millions $  1996 
  big medium  small  TOTAL 
Sales   100  26,643 266 12,984 1,191 7,978 1,557 47,605 
Sales of own production  100  23,169 264 11,952 1,161 7,408 1,525 42,529 
Sales of others’ production  62  3,474 121 1,032 360 570 543 5,076 
Imports   100  4,441 266 1,843 1,191 907 1,557 7,191 
Imports of capital goods   84  454 184 237 329 168 597 860 
Imports of inputs   85  2,615 211 1,195 530 578 826 4,388 
Imports of final products   51  1,344 89 403 165 158 305 1,904 
Imports of services (inc. techno)  12  27 19 8 27 3 58 39 
Exports 100  5,770 266 1,804 1,191 786 1,557 8,360 
                
% GROWTH 
  big medium  small  TOTAL 
Sales      49.5   34.7   8.4   36.7 
Sales of own production  1.0  47.9 0.8 31.7 1.4 6.4 1.3 34.2 
Sales of others’ production  29.2  61.4 30.1 81.6 17.3 45.0 21.2 63.0 
Imports      63.8   50.0   30.9   55.2 
Imports of capital goods   25.4  136.8 26.0 97.6 16.3 32.4 20.4 95.9 
Imports of inputs   11.8  45.4 18.5 42.3 20.7 35.5 19.2 43.2 
Imports of final products   21.4  91.0 50.8 50.6 38.7 16.2 38.6 72.1 
Imports of services (inc. techno)  100.0  58.6 72.7 543.0 170.0 -15.6 114.8 75.5 
Exports     87.9   101.5   70.4   88.8 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on The Survey. 
Note: size was defined in terms of the amount of sales, where big firms sold more than $100 million, medium firms sold 
more than $25 million but less than $100 million, and small firms sold less than $25 million. 27
new strategy might also imply a collapse of the indigenous potential for creating new
knowledge.
Table 3b Innovative Efforts: Structure and growth rate in innovative activities
To sum up, given serious methodological limitations to delimit what conforms with the
malleability culture, the empirical analysis relies on specialisation oriented to national
markets and an increasing importance of managerial activities as proxies for firms’
commitment to the malleability culture. These tendencies were empirically manifested
in an increased importance of industrial firms’ imports of final goods (Table 3a); a
bigger share in total sales of goods produced by third parties (Table 3a); and an
augmented importance of innovative spending related to management (Table 3b).
Although these highlight the spirit of what was defined as malleability, they are neither
complete nor totally accurate. Expenditures in management could be strictly related to
production and demand-side activities were artificially repressed before liberalisation.
Therefore, the empirical results concerning malleability should be considered just as an
illustration  that calls attention to the importance of macroeconomic environment in
shaping firm behaviour.
3.2 Empirical illustration
In what follows, the determinants of technological and economic performance will be
evaluated. Two distinct patterns will then emerge, one corresponding to technological
performance and another to economic performance.
 
  big medium  small  TOTAL 
















TOTAL INNOVATIVE EFFORTS  100%  69.1 100% 65.1 100% 17.9 100%  58.0
INSIDE THE FIRM  7%  57.8 18% 29.5 18% 68.9 12%  47.5
Total R+D  51%  53.7 45% 30.3 42% 67.0 47%  46.3
Basic research   28%  31.5 16% 15.9 10% 146.8 20%  32.6
Applied research   26%  277.6 21% 66.1 9% 58.2 20%  133.7
Products and process development   46%  25.4 63% 25.5 81% 61.6 60%  33.9
Total Other innovative activities  49%  62.4 55% 28.8 58% 70.2 53%  48.6
Products and process adaptation   27%  35.5 14% 48.5 16% 37.3 19%  39.5
Technical assistance to production   25%  14.0 21% 12.8 20% 50.2 22%  20.2
Project engineering   25%  102.4 19% 29.7 15% 53.6 20%  59.3
Administration reorganisation   5%  1,274.0 7% 21.4 6% 103.7 6%  83.7
General organisation   2%  295.1 7% 50.1 20% 97.6 9%  85.6
Commercialisation   9%  116.6 9% 31.4 14% 258.8 11%  97.8
Other innovative activities   7%  230.9 22% 29.8 8% 24.2 13%  44.6
OUTSIDE THE FIRM  93%  70.1 82% 75.4 82% 10.5 88%  59.4
Total Transfer  15%  48.0 15% 38.1 8% 59.6 14%  46.3
Transfer technology new brands   18%  37.2 25% 94.1 42% 127.9 22%  61.1
Other transfer of technology  82%  50.5 75% 26.0 58% 30.9 78%  42.7
Local 5%  83.7 15% 41.9 33% 93.5 10%  67.8
External 95%  46.5 85% 37.5 67% 46.9 90%  44.3
Embodied technology  81%  73.3 77% 83.2 85% 2.7 80%  59.4
Investment in national capital goods   51%  41.0 39% 51.5 51% 0.6 48%  34.5
Investment in imported capital goods   49%  128.2 61% 111.1 49% 4.8 52%  92.8
Consultancy   4%  108.5 9% 90.5 7% 161.0 6%  108.1
Source:  Author’s calculation based on The Survey. 28
Following the above discussion, there are three main propositions on technological
performance that require empirical verification. First, is that technological behaviour
actually advances technological performance. Secondly, we should also be able to
demonstrate that micro and sectoral attributes that enhanced appropriability and
cumulativeness (largely important to encouraging technological behaviour) are
beneficial to technological performance. Finally, there is the question of whether the
malleability culture that characterised survival during the 1990s, was harmful for
technological development for those that were not a-priori chosen.
However, it will be shown that these propositions are not valid for explaining economic
performance.  Furthermore,  some determinants that hampered technological
performance did encourage economic performance.
3.2.1 Technological performance
i) Dependent variables
There are two questions included in The Survey that explore actual innovations
(defined in this case as the introduction of “new” products or processes
21) rather than
perceptions. Strictly speaking, they are still subjective indicators (firms themselves
evaluate what an innovation is), however they could be considered a closer
measurement of performance.
In question 413 firms were asked to inform whether they had introduced new products
due to the introduction of novel inputs, the introduction of a new process, or a frontier
movement in scientific knowledge. They are also asked whether they had improved old
products or introduced some product differentiation. The variable takes on values of 0
to 5 as shown in Table 3c.
Table 3c: Measurements of Product and Process Innovation
                                                
21The answers, though, are subject to the firm’s ideas of what is new (e.g. new for the firm?, new for the local
market? new for the world?).
Variable 
413 
Five possible types of product innovation: 
 Due to the introduction of novel inputs 
 Due to the introduction of new processes 
 Due to a frontier movement in the scientific knowledge 
 Improvement of existent products 
 Product differentiation 
 
Value When 
0  None of them were informed 
1 At  least  one 
2  At least two of them 
3  At least three of them  
4  At least four of them 




Four possible types of process innovation: 
 Due to the introduction of new products 
 Due to a frontier movement in the scientific knowledge 
 Improvement of existent processes 
 Introduction of machinery or equipment associated to new processes 
 
Value When 
0  None of them were informed 
1  At least one 
2  At least two of them 
3  At least three of them 
4  The four types of process innovation were informed 
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On the other hand, question 414 asked whether firms had introduced new processes
due to either the introduction of a new product or some movement in the scientific
frontier. This question also asked whether there were improvements in existing
products and whether machinery and equipment associated with new processes were
introduced. The variable ranges between 0 and 4 as shown in Table 3c.
ii) Model estimation
The aim is to analyse the determinants of technological performance in order to
corroborate the above propositions. Therefore, in Table 3d, I present an ordered probit
model to estimate the relationship of these dependent variables and a set of
independent variables that are related to these hypotheses
22.
Table 3d: Ordered Probit Regression on Product and Process Innovation
Variable definition: same as above except:
Investment in Fixed Assets Avg. 92-96: includes national and imported capital goods, buildings, reparation and maintenance and
other fixed assets, measured in thousands of pesos 1peso=1US$
                                                
22 I also included total investments in physical assets as a control variable.
N 1414 N 1414
Pseudo R2 0.1114 Pseudo R2 0.1369
Ind. Variables Coef. Sig. z Coef. Sig. z
Ln Investment in Fixed Assets Avg. 92-96 0.063350 *** 4.27 0.115013 *** 7.57
Commodities -0.198989 ** -2.46 -0.013557 -0.17
Food Commodities -0.210807 * -1.67 -0.272411 ** -2.11
Diffuser 0.022175 0.23 -0.051361 -0.53
Durable Goods -0.130504 -1.24 0.094564 0.88
RD Avg. 92-96 0.000782 *** 2.71 0.000478 * 1.66
Other Inn. Activities (production) Avg. 92-96 -0.000368 * -1.92 -0.000148 -0.77
Other Inn. Activities (management) Avg. 92-96 0.000925 1.59 0.000228 0.45
Transfer of Technology Avg. 92-96 0.000127 * 1.88 0.000077 1.4
Expo Avg. 92-96 -0.000002 -1.11 -0.000001 -0.98
Import of Capital Goods Avg. 92-96 0.000004 0.18 0.000011 0.55
Import of Inputs Avg. 92-96 0.000004 0.99 0.000000 -0.07
Imports of Final Products Avg. 92-96 -0.000003 -0.56 -0.000011 ** -2.1
Imports of Services Avg 92-96 0.000176 ** 2.01 -0.000027 -0.27
Decentralised Information 0.099864 *** 6.69 0.094375 *** 6.25
Centralised Information 0.037687 *** 3.21 0.034302 *** 2.91
Size 0.257280 1.5 0.423578 ** 2.44
Age 0.001444 1.13 0.001220 0.94
Foreign 0.190083 ** 2.49 0.158885 ** 2.06
Technological Strategy 0.120884 *** 9.77 0.148191 *** 11.73
Organisational Strategy 0.013537 * 1.67 0.002788 0.34
*** Significant at 99%, ** Significant at 95%, *Significant at 90%
Source: Author’s calculation based on The Survey.
Dep. Variable: 413 product 
innovation
Dep. Variable: 414 process 
innovation30
  First proposition: innovative behaviour positively influenced technological
performance
Both sets of results show that technological performance was greatly influenced by a
commitment towards a technological strategy (behavioural dimension), which is an
important result to show that both dimensions are related.
On the other hand, a strategy that attempted to improve organisational matters did not
seem to have such a definite effect on technological performance. Organisational
strategy was not significant to explain process innovation and was only marginally
significant for product innovation
23. Therefore, the argument that says that
organisational capabilities are necessary to improve technological capabilities was only
partially true in Argentina
24.
Technological efforts inside the firms in the form of Research and Development, even
after controlling for both innovative strategies, were important for explaining product
and process innovation (recall that they were also significant for increasing the
likelihood of these strategies).
  Second proposition: micro and sectoral attributes that characterise appropriability
and cumulativeness foster technological performance
Large and foreign firms enjoyed high degrees of appropriability conditions and
consequently they performed better in process and product innovation. This micro
attributes are also the ones used to define the a-priori chosen firms.
Moreover, as could be expected, firms that systematically enhanced their technological
capability and invest in R&D enjoyed greater degree of cumulativeness and also
performed better in technology.
On the other hand, those sectors that are traditionally considered to be technologically
more dynamic did not show here an outstanding technological performance, once
expenditures in R&D were controlled for
25. However, dummy variables for those sectors
that are meant to be less dynamic did affect negatively product and process
innovations. The commodity sector was one of the winning sectors after liberalisation
(see below) and consequently many of the a-priori chosen firms belonged to it. This
confirms the structuralist view which claimed that, in the absence of counterbalancing
policies, trade liberalisation could drive specialisation towards non-technologically
dynamic areas.
  Third proposition: commitment towards a malleability culture deters technological
performance
Other innovative efforts related to production seem to be negatively correlated with
product innovation, but not with process innovation. Among the three possible activities
within this category (i.e. adaptation, technical assistance to production, and project
                                                
23 Nick von Tunzelmann [1995] argued that process innovation is more likely to be advanced by knowledge and
product innovation is advanced by market competition. Given that an organisational strategy is also more likely to be
induced by market competition, it is not very surprising that it shows a tiny association with product innovation but not
with process innovation. By the same token, if process innovation was advanced by knowledge it should be more
sensitive to cumulativeness (and given the costs of capability building also to appropriability) than product innovation.
Actually, as is shown in Table 3d, despite the strategic movement of each firm (i.e. after controlling for both
innovative strategies), size appeared as positively affecting process but not product innovation.
24 Organisational strategy in Argentina was largely based on cost rationalisation (especially labour costs).
25 Dummy variables for both the durable goods sector and the diffuser of technical progress sector were significant
when expenditure in R&D was dropped from the regression.31
engineering), adaptation of products may be one that affected product innovation.
Apparently, adaptation deterred actual innovation in products. Given the general
concern for demand-side activities, it could likely be the case that adaptation means
here a light transformation (e.g. packaging) either of former production or of imported
products, rather than major changes. If that were the case, such activity could be
considered closer to management than to production.
Actually, those variables related to the malleability culture were either insignificant in
explaining technological performance (innovative activities related to management) or
affected it negatively (imports of final products).
Thus, firms that were more committed to a survival strategy and imported more final
products to widen their mix of products for sale were less committed to a long-term
strategy and therefore less successful in process innovation. This also shows that
specialisation in Argentina was not oriented to international markets. Consequently, it
did not constitute a competitive improvement in domestic production but only a
reduction in the production mix.
3.2.2 Economic  performance
i) Dependent variables
Having confirmed the three hypotheses for technological performance, I next attempt to
test empirically whether the same could be said for economic performance. However,
The Survey does not provide information on firms’ value added. Therefore,
measurement of either a production function or productivity needs to rely on information
on sales, which is obviously far from ideal.
I therefore took two different indicators of economic performance (natural logarithm of
sales and natural logarithm of the ratio of sales over labour) during two different periods
(the last period available –1996, and an average of the whole period covered by The
Survey – from 1992 to 1996) to enhance the robustness of the results.
ii) Model  estimation
Tables 3e and 3f present simple regression models that estimate the relationship of
these dependent variables using a set of independent variables related to the above-
mentioned propositions
26. The hypothesis in this case is that the determinants of
economic performance are different and sometimes opposite to what explained
technological performance.
                                                
26 A variable that measured total investments in fixed assets was used as a control variable for regressions on the
ratio sales/labour, while the same variable plus labour were used as control variables for regressions on sales.32
Table 3e: Determinants of Productivity measured by Sales 92-96
Variable definition: same as above except
Total Labour Avg. 92-96: includes total employees: production, management, R&D and others
N 1347 N 1336
Adjusted R2 0.2319 Adjusted R2 0.8197
Ind. Variables Coef. Sig. t Coef. Sig. t
Ln Investment in Fixed Assets Avg. 92-96 0.096642 *** 9.91 0.125046 *** 11.51
Ln Total Labour Avg. 92-96 0.873223 *** 39.05
Commodities 0.031525 0.59 0.043314 0.82
Food Commodities 0.253979 *** 3 0.248815 *** 2.97
Diffuser -0.106295 * -1.67 -0.152858 ** -2.41
Durable Goods 0.043663 0.62 0.056080 0.81
RD Avg. 92-96 -0.000112 -0.7 -0.000049 -0.31
Other Inn. Activities (production) Avg. 92-96 0.000062 0.46 0.000084 0.63
Other Inn. Activities (management) Avg. 92-96 0.000560 * 1.7 0.000588 * 1.81
Transfer of Technology Avg. 92-96 -0.000022 -0.57 -0.000011 -0.28
Expo Avg. 92-96 0.000004 *** 4.42 0.000004 *** 4.8
Import of Capital Goods Avg. 92-96 -0.000072 *** -4.26 -0.000067 *** -4.02
Import of Inputs Avg. 92-96 0.000009 *** 3.49 0.000010 *** 3.78
Imports of Final Products Avg. 92-96 0.000008 ** 2.3 0.000008 ** 2.14
Imports of Services Avg 92-96 0.000045 0.82 0.000049 0.89
Decentralised Information 0.009924 0.99 0.009526 0.96
Centralised Information -0.007458 -0.95 -0.005134 -0.66
Size 0.424848 *** 3.63 0.523930 *** 4.48
Age -0.001469 * -1.69 -0.000024 -0.03
Foreign 0.288951 *** 5.6 0.326163 *** 6.34
Technological Strategy -0.002298 -0.28 0.000302 0.04
Organisational Strategy 0.008028 1.46 0.010572 * 1.94
*** Significant at 99%, ** Significant at 95%, *Significant at 90%
Source: Author’s calculation based on The Survey.
Dep. Variable: Ln Productivity 
(Sales/Labour)Avg. 92-96
Dep. Variable: Ln Sales Avg. 92-
9633
Table 3f: Determinants of Productivity measured by Sales 96
Variable definition: same as above
  First proposition: did innovative behaviour positively influence economic
performance?
Although Table 3d showed that technological behaviour fostered technological
performance, it is not possible to extrapolate this result to economic performance.
Neither technological strategy nor investments in research and development were
significant for explaining economic performance. Sales and productivity were detached
from technological commitment, which is not too surprising when one looks deeply into
the behavioural dimension.
As was largely described in section 3.1.1, trade liberalisation did not encourage
efficiency because it did not break with the predominant macro behaviour. Many years
of macro uncertainty plus inconsistent policy design had rewarded strategies that
prioritised malleability. In such a context, any long-term strategy militates against mere
survival unless the firm’s micro and sectoral attributes make it a-priori chosen to
survive.
  Second proposition: did micro and sectoral attributes that characterise
appropriability and cumulativeness foster economic performance
As discussed above, micro attributes that characterise appropriability and
cumulativeness conditions were very similar to those that help a firm being a-priori
chosen  by the macro environment. Therefore, those attributes should be (and they
were) positively related to economic performance.
N 1347 N 1347
Adjusted R2 0.2319 Adjusted R2 0.804
Ind. Variables Coef. Sig. t Coef. Sig. .       z
Ln Investment in Fixed Assets 96 0.093292 *** 9.14 0.111409 *** 9.85
Ln Total Labour 96 0.913545 *** 38.54
Commodities 0.101915 * 1.81 0.105998 * 1.89
Food Commodities 0.330959 *** 3.74 0.333132 *** 3.78
Diffuser -0.063714 -0.92 -0.099743 -1.43
Durable Goods -0.017935 -0.23 -0.011521 -0.15
RD Avg. 92-96 -0.000116 -0.67 -0.000074 -0.43
Other Inn. Activities (production) Avg. 92-96 0.000063 0.44 0.000078 0.55
Other Inn. Activities (management) Avg. 92-96 0.000570 1.61 0.000608 * 1.72
Transfer of Technology Avg. 92-96 -0.000045 -1.25 -0.000037 -1.03
Expo Avg. 92-96 0.000004 *** 4.47 0.000005 *** 4.71
Import of Capital Goods Avg. 92-96 -0.000067 *** -4.88 -0.000064 *** -4.69
Import of Inputs Avg. 92-96 0.000009 *** 3.24 0.000009 *** 3.43
Imports of Final Products Avg. 92-96 0.000010 *** 2.85 0.000009 *** 2.69
Imports of Services Avg 92-96 0.000035 0.59 0.000039 0.65
Decentralised Information 0.005092 0.48 0.005135 0.48
Centralised Information -0.008232 -0.98 -0.006133 -0.73
Size 0.483218 *** 3.83 0.562407 *** 4.41
Age -0.000120 -0.13 0.000661 0.71
Foreign 0.325802 *** 6.03 0.354067 *** 6.51
Technological Strategy 0.002494 0.29 0.004980 0.57
Organisational Strategy 0.006943 1.19 0.008534 1.47
*** Significant at 99%, ** Significant at 95%, *Significant at 90%
Source: Author’s calculation based on The Survey.
Dep. Variable: Ln Productivity 
(Sales/Labour) 96 Dep. Variable: Ln Sales 9634
On the other hand, contrary to what was found for technological performance, the
commodity sector, especially food commodities, did significantly better than the other
sectors in economic terms.
In point of fact, these a-priori chosen firms pursued aggressive investments in capital-
intensive state-of-the-art techniques, especially in the commodity sector [Katz, 2000b].
Again, this result in economic performance is not surprising under the Argentinean
macro environment during the 1990s. On the one hand, credit markets were
fragmented; on the other hand uncertainty brought an absolute preference for liquidity
in dollars. These firms were those with easier access to capital markets and to foreign
markets. On top of that, they benefited from other policies, like privatisation, which are
beyond the scope of this analysis. They were definitely among the winners of the
liberalisation period in economic terms.
  Third proposition: did commitment towards a malleability culture deter economic
performance?
The malleability culture existed because it was rewarded in such a macro environment.
As stressed before, it is very difficult to assess its existence, especially with this type of
information based on industrial activities.
However, it could be still seen that those activities that were identified in section 3.1.2
as characteristic of the new managerial model inside the firm orientated towards
domestic demand were successful determinants of economic performance. Thus, while
imports of final products had a negative effect on process innovation they had a strong
positive effect in the four different ways used here to measure economic performance.
Moreover, expenditures on innovative activities related to management that were not
significant in explaining technological performance had a positive, though weak, impact
on economic performance.
Thus, although its relation to economic efficiency can be queried, these results illustrate
that malleability was economically rewarded in this new macro economic environment.
Probably, the biological metaphor may work under different (usually quite restricted)
behavioural assumptions.35
Conclusions
Among the large variety of macro policies, the most careful attention in relation to
technology has been paid to trade policy. Within this topic it is possible to find studies
that belong to endogenous growth theory which argue that openness broadens the
technological knowledge base and enlarges the technological opportunities available
for the country that liberalises trade. Therefore, they predict a positive impact of trade
liberalisation on technological and economic performance. On the other hand, there is a
whole array of studies belonging to different theoretical approaches which are critical
about early liberalisation. Their arguments rely on the importance of developing
indigenous capabilities (that early liberalisation may hamper) and the need to drive
specialisation towards technologically dynamic activities instead of relying on static
comparative advantages.
This paper, on the contrary, has argued that the final impact of trade liberalisation on
technological and economic performance was dependent on its impact on the firms’
decision-making process. Empirical results were drawn from the Argentinean
Innovation Survey carried out in 1997.
Two main claims guided the discussion, one emphasising the importance of micro
behaviour, the other the importance of macro behaviour.
Firstly, the ultimate impact of openness on technological performance will be
dependent on its incidence on the macro, sectoral and micro elements that affect
OACK conditions in the behavioural dimension, which is the abstract locus
where decisions are shaped.
Although the literature on technological change recognises that firms differ in their
strategies towards technological acquisition, when coming down to empirical evidence
or even when developing formalised theoretical models, most seem to overlook the
behavioural dimension and only assess the performance dimension.
This paper has in fact shown that introducing the behavioural dimension narrows the
differences between the two approaches mentioned above in regard to the relation
between trade and technological performance (Part 2.1).
In Part 2.2.1, using latent class analysis, I identified two types of innovative strategies.
There was one strategy more oriented to technological innovation, and another more
oriented towards production re-organisation. The latter could be interpreted as strategy
aiming at a once-for-all gain in efficiency, while the former could be interpreted as a
longer-term scheme.
Part 2.2.2 showed that firms that imported capital goods and were active in absorbing
(technological) information from the environment were also more likely to commit
themselves to innovative strategies. Therefore, one could agree with the endogenous
growth theory that opportunities embodied in capital goods and (arguably) more
accessible information pushed a technological interest among firms that had imported
those goods or absorbed that information.
However, more often than otherwise, these firms relied on conditions of cumulativeness
and appropriability to take advantage of the newly available opportunities and the
broadened knowledge base. Therefore, it could not be taken as representative of the
whole industrial sector that came out of the 1990s.
It was shown in the same section that size and nationality on the one hand, and age
and capability-building efforts inside the firms (basically investment in R&D and in other36
innovative activities related to production) on the other hand, were significant in
explaining both a technological and an organisational strategy. Whereas the former
variables could be considered as a proxy for appropriability, the latter variables show
that cumulativeness was also fundamental to commitment to innovation. By the same
token, the commodity sector was significantly less dynamic and the durable goods
sector significantly more dynamic than the control group (the traditional sector). Both
findings give credit to the importance of indigenous capability building and sectoral
specialisation when developing a technological strategy, as the critics of free trade have
insisted.
Therefore, the policy prescription that stems from this analysis is not a claim for more
government intervention in trade. Rather, the argument here is for a different type of
intervention towards the enhancement of OACK conditions at a national level.
This drives us to the second claim of this paper: the macro behaviour that prevailed
in Argentina at the time of liberalisation separated economic from technological
performance as two distinct outcomes with different (sometimes opposite)
characteristics. Firms that were successful at product and process innovation
(i.e. technological performance) replicated the same patterns that characterised
technological behaviour. However, patterns of successful economic performance
diverged from them and did not necessarily amount to an efficiency criterion.
In Argentina reforms were carried out in a macro context characterised by structural
macro uncertainty, a long history of inconsistent and changing macro policies and
imperfect markets (especially capital markets). Most of the firms were therefore
conservative and distrusted the sustainability of national policies. This, on the one
hand, favoured policy overshooting and liberal dogmatism, and on the other hand
prioritised short-term strategies aiming at survival over long-term ones aiming at
growth.
However, among survivors two markedly different groups could be identified.
There were some firms whose micro and sectoral attributes make them ‘a-priori’ in a
stronger position to survive, regardless of their efficiency (e.g. big firms, foreign firms, or
those that based production on natural resources). The reason for this is that in this
macro environment, which showed different features from what is usually assumed in
the conventional wisdom, an easier access to capital markets and foreign currency was
rewarded. Section 3 showed that while these firms did better in economic performance,
their sectoral attributes deterred technological accumulation.
The rest (e.g. small firms, firms producing non-traditional products, firms located in
remote places, etc.) needed to follow a survival strategy that would enable them to
react faster to changing situations. This created a series of short-term strategies that
were distinct from innovative strategies, and usually even beyond the industrial sphere.
The macro environment rewarded malleability, and therefore it was more effective for
this group of industrial firms to maximise sales by investing in management rather than
in R&D, and to commit themselves to short-run strategies orientated to domestic
markets rather than long-term strategies aimed at gaining competitiveness. Even
though they remained conservative in production techniques, they were nevertheless
flexible to survive in changing markets. Thus, the best possible decision for each firm
did not drive the economy as a whole to a point closer to the production possibility
frontier.37
Despite the intrinsic limitations to assess malleability quantitatively, I considered two
activities as proxies for firms’ commitment to the malleability culture: investment in
management and imports of final products. Section 3.2 showed that whereas these two
activities enhanced economic performance they discouraged technological
performance.
To sum up, years of uncertainty and inconsistent policies have brought about a national
preference for malleability. Firms were conservative and distrusted the sustainability of
national policies. Given the absence of technological or other complementary policies
that could have enhanced appropriability and cumulativeness for all firms and the
fragmentation of capital markets, liberalisation favoured firms that shared certain
characteristics while discriminating against the rest. Especially for the latter group, the
predominant macro behaviour made economic success dependent on strategies
different from innovative ones. Thus, they did not advance a technological strategy
despite the new technological opportunities created after trade liberalisation
Accordingly, the situation militated against the acquisition of technological capabilities
and therefore against national technological accumulation, exacerbating the risk of
creating a technological trap.
In any case, the point here is not to blame liberalisation for this entire situation,
but to argue that unexpected consequences in performance could eventuate
when behaviour is overlooked in policy design. The same may be applied to the
current crisis and the potential blessings that could be expected from
devaluation.
Although devaluation enhances price competitiveness of national products, exports will
not take off automatically, neither will they constitute a generalised consequence of
current macro environment. Again, a diversity of behaviour will prevail.
This paper has shown that the post-liberalisation environment, which was characterised
by an overvaluation of the peso, encouraged a deeper integration with external
providers, both inside and outside the malleability culture. Outside this culture, links
with external providers of general services and producers of technology were tightened,
and imported products were introduced as part of a technological strategy (imports of
inputs and capital goods that were incorporated into national production). On the other
hand, trade liberalisation also enhanced practices grounded in the malleability culture,
like the possibility of importing cheap final goods to widen the mix of final products for
sale.
Given that it is by definition easier to abandon a strategy grounded on malleability than
a more proactive one, conservative firms that did not pursue structural changes in
production after liberalisation and relied mainly on a survival strategy are at the present
time in a better situation to survive the crisis because they do not need further
restructuring to replace the now expensive imports. Malleability is once again rewarded.
On the other hand, big firms, multinational firms and those that rely on static
comparative advantage also enjoy larger margins for manoeuvring.
Therefore, unless OACK conditions are enhanced at a national level, which, among
other things, requires not only commitment towards technology policies but also an
urgent transformation of financial institutions (rather than just restoration of previous
credit opportunities), the new survivors will again be either the a-priori chosen firms, or
the speculative-conservative ones, or both.38
Appendix 1
Categories ISIC Description
Automobile Sector 3410 Manufacture of motor vehicles
3420 Manufacture of bodies (coachwork) for motor vehicles; manufacture of
trailers and semi-trailers
3430 Manufacture of parts and accessories for motor vehicles and their engines
Commodities 1711 Preparation and spinning of textile fibres; weaving of textiles
1712 Finishing of textiles
1911 Tanning and dressing of leather
2010 Sawmilling and planing of wood
2021 Manufacture of veneer sheets; manufacture of plywood, laminboard, particle
board and other panels and boards
2101 Manufacture of pulp, paper and paperboard
2102 Manufacture of corrugated paper and paperboard and of containers of paper
and paperboard
2109 Manufacture of other articles of paper and paperboard
2310 Manufacture of coke oven products
2320 Manufacture of refined petroleum products
2411 Manufacture of basic chemicals, except fertilizers and nitrogen compounds
2412 Manufacture of fertilizers and nitrogen compounds
2413 Manufacture of plastics in primary forms and of synthetic rubber
2422 Manufacture of paints, varnishes and similar coatings, printing ink and
mastics
2511 Manufacture of rubber tyres and tubes; retreading and rebuilding of rubber
tyres
2694 Manufacture of cement, lime and plaster
2696 Cutting, shaping and finishing of stone
2710 Manufacture of basic iron and steel
2720 Manufacture of basic precious and non-ferrous metals
3130 Manufacture of insulated wire and cable
3150 Manufacture of electric lamps and lighting equipment
Diffuser of Technical
Progress
2421 Manufacture of pesticides and other agro-chemical products
2911 Manufacture of engines and turbines, except aircraft, vehicle and cycle
engines
2912 Manufacture of pumps, compressors, taps and valves
2913 Manufacture of bearings, gears, gearing and driving elements
2914 Manufacture of ovens, furnaces and furnace burners
2915 Manufacture of lifting and handling equipment
2919 Manufacture of other general purpose machinery
2921 Manufacture of agricultural and forestry machinery
2922 Manufacture of machine-tools
2923 Manufacture of machinery for metallurgy
2924 Manufacture of machinery for mining, quarrying and construction
2925 Manufacture of machinery for food, beverage and tobacco processing
2926 Manufacture of machinery for textile, apparel and leather production
2927 Manufacture of weapons and ammunition
2929 Manufacture of other special purpose machinery
3000 Manufacture of office, accounting and computing machinery
3110 Manufacture of electric motors, generators and transformers
3120 Manufacture of electricity distribution and control apparatus




3220 Manufacture of television and radio transmitters and apparatus for line
telephony and line telegraphy
3311 Manufacture of medical and surgical equipment and orthopaedic appliances
3312 Manufacture of instruments and appliances for measuring, checking, testing,
navigating and other purposes, except industrial process control equipment
3313 Manufacture of industrial process control equipment
3511 Building and repairing of ships
3520 Manufacture of railway and tramway locomotives and rolling stock
3530 Manufacture of aircraft and spacecraft
Durable Goods 2930 Manufacture of domestic appliances n.e.c.
3230 Manufacture of television and radio receivers, sound or video recording or
reproducing apparatus, and associated goods
3320 Manufacture of optical instruments and photographic equipment
3330 Manufacture of watches and clocks
3512 Building and repairing of pleasure and sporting boats
3591 Manufacture of motorcycles
3592 Manufacture of bicycles and invalid carriages
3599 Manufacture of other transport equipment n.e.c.
Food Commodities 1513 Processing and preserving of fruit and vegetables
1514 Manufacture of vegetable and animal oils and fats
1531 Manufacture of grain mill products
1532 Manufacture of starches and starch products
1533 Manufacture of prepared animal feeds
1542 Manufacture of sugar
Traditional 1511 Production, processing and preserving of meat and meat products
1512 Processing and preserving of fish and fish products
1520 Manufacture of dairy products
1541 Manufacture of bakery products
1543 Manufacture of cocoa, chocolate and sugar confectionery
1544 Manufacture of macaroni, noodles, couscous and similar farinaceous
products
1549 Manufacture of other food products n.e.c.
1551 Distilling, rectifying and blending of spirits; ethyl alcohol production from
fermented materials
1552 Manufacture of wines
1553 Manufacture of malt liquors and malt
1554 Manufacture of soft drinks; production of mineral waters
1600 Manufacture of tobacco products
1721 Manufacture of made-up textile articles, except apparel
1722 Manufacture of carpets and rugs
1723 Manufacture of cordage, rope, twine and netting
1729 Manufacture of other textiles n.e.c.
1730 Manufacture of knitted and crocheted fabrics and articles
1810 Manufacture of wearing apparel, except fur apparel
1820 Dressing and dyeing of fur; manufacture of articles of fur
1912 Manufacture of luggage, handbags and the like, saddlery and harness
1920 Manufacture of footwear
2022 Manufacture of builders' carpentry and joinery
2023 Manufacture of wooden containers
2029 Manufacture of other products of wood; manufacture of articles of cork, straw
and plaiting materials
2211 Publishing of books, brochures, musical books and other publications
2212 Publishing of newspapers, journals and periodicals40
2213 Publishing of recorded media
Categories ISIC Description
Traditional 2219 Other publishing
2221 Printing
2222 Service activities related to printing
2230 Reproduction of recorded media
2423 Manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemicals and botanical products
2424 Manufacture of soap and detergents, cleaning and polishing preparations,
perfumes and toilet preparations
2429 Manufacture of other chemical products n.e.c.
2430 Manufacture of man-made fibres
2519 Manufacture of other rubber products
2520 Manufacture of plastics products
2610 Manufacture of glass and glass products
2691 Manufacture of non-structural non-refractory ceramic ware
2692 Manufacture of refractory ceramic products
2693 Manufacture of structural non-refractory clay and ceramic products
2695 Manufacture of articles of concrete, cement and plaster
2699 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products n.e.c.
2731 Casting of iron and steel
2732 Casting of non-ferrous metals
2811 Manufacture of structural metal products
2812 Manufacture of tanks, reservoirs and containers of metal
2813 Manufacture of steam generators, except central heating hot water boilers
2891 Forging, pressing, stamping and roll-forming of metal; powder metallurgy
2893 Manufacture of cutlery, hand tools and general hardware
2899 Manufacture of other fabricated metal products n.e.c.
3140 Manufacture of accumulators, primary cells and primary batteries
3190 Manufacture of other electrical equipment n.e.c.
3610 Manufacture of furniture
3691 Manufacture of jewellery and related articles
3692 Manufacture of musical instruments
3693 Manufacture of sports goods
3694 Manufacture of games and toys
3699 Other manufacturing n.e.c.41
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